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STUDENT NOTES
CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON-NATURE OF THE OFFENSE
IN KENTUCKY
All forty-eight states have statutes in one form or another forbidding the
carrying of concealed weapons. Many allow it if the person has a license.- A few
states only forbid it in settled places" and some states forbid the carrying of
deadly weapons' or pistolsv either openly or concealed,
The first statute enacted in Kentucky prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons was declared unconstitutional in 1822." Following the adoption of a
'ALA. CoDE, tt. 14, Sec. 161 (1940); ARIz. CODE ANN. Sec. 43-2205 (1939); ARK.
STr~. ANN. Sec. 41-4501 (1947); CAL. GEN. LAWS, Art. 1970, Sec. 5 (Deering, 1944);
COLO. STAT. ANN., C 8, Sec. 245 (1935); CONN. GEN. SrAT. Sec. 6219 (1930); DEL. REV.
CoDL Sec. 5286 (1935); FLA. SrAT. Sec. 790.01 (1941); GA. CoDE ANN. Sec. 3-17 (Park,
19141): IDnAH Con ANN. Sec. 17-3102 (1932) ILL. REV. STAI., c. 38, Sec. 155 (1945);
IN). STAT. ANN. Sec. 10-4706 (Burns, 1933); IowA Cot Sec. 695.2 (19-16); KILN. GEN.
SiAr. ANN. Sec. 21-2-111 (1935); LA. CODE OF CRnM.. LAW, art. 740-95 (Dart, 1943): MI.
Ri v. STAr., c. 112, Sec. 13 (1930); MoD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws, art. 27, Sec. 40 (Flack,
1939): M.ss. GIN. LAws, c. 269, Sec. 10 (1932); MicH. CosPri. LAws, art. 16753 (1929);
MINNs. Srtr. Sec. 616.41 (Henderson, 1945): MISS. CODE ANN. Sec. 2079 (1942); Mo.
Rix. STAT. ANN. Sec. 4423 (139); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. Sees. 11302, 11303 (1935);
Nt it. RE'. STAT. Sec. 28-1001 (1943); NEE. Cop. Lxws Sec. 10251 (Hillyer, 1929);
N. H. REV. LAWS, c. 179, Sec. 4; c. 455, Sees. 27, 28 (1942); N. M. STAT. ANN. Sec.
41-1701 (1941); N. J. REV. STAT. Sec. 2:176-41 (1937); N. Y. LAWS, Pt. 1, Sec. 1897,
p. 1935 (Thompson, 1939); N. C. GEN. SrAT. ANN. Sec. 14-269 (1943); N. D. Co.Ni'.
LAws SeCs. 9803a6, 1803bi (Supp. 1925); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. Sec. 12819 (Page,
1939); OKLA. STAT.. tit. 21, Sec. 1271 (1941); ORE. Co.n'. LAWs ANN., Sec. 25-301
(1940); PA. SrAT., Tit. 18, Sec. 401 (Purdon, 1936); R. I. GEN. LAWS, c. 612, Sec. 31
(1938); S. C. CooE ANN. Sec. 1256 (1912); S. D. CODE Sec. 13.1609 (1939); TENN.
Coin. ANN. Sec. 11007 (Williams, 1934); TEx. SiA-r., PENAL CODE, art. 483 (Vernon,
1936); Uir~u CooE ANN. Sec. 103-21-- (1913); Vr. PuB. LAws Sec. 8409 (1933); VA.
Coot ANN. Sec. -534 (1942); WAsH. Riv. SATr. ANN. Sec. 2517 (Remington, 1931);
See. 2516-5 (Remington, Supp. 1940); W VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 6043 (1943); WVss. STAT.
Sec. 310.69 (1943); Wso. CosN'. STAr. ANN. Sec. 9-1203 (1945).
'E.g., CAL. GEN. LAWS, act 1970, Sec. 5, (Deermg, 1944); CONN. GEN. STAT. Sec.
6219 (1930); DEL. REV. CODE Sec. 5286, 5287 (1935); IOWA CODE Sec. 695.2 (1946);
NLv. Coir. LAws Sec. 10251 (Hillyer, 1929); UTAH CODE ANN. Sec. 103-21-4 (1943);
VL. CoD ANN. Sec. 4534 (1942).
"E.g., IDAHO Coot ANN. Sec. 17-3102 (1932); NEV. Co.srp. LAws Sec. 10251 (Hill-
'er, 1929); N. M. STAT. ANN. Sec. -11-1701 (1941); N. Y. LAWS, pt. 1, Sec. 1897, p. 1935
(Thompson, 1939).
'E.g., MAss. GEIN. LAws. c. 269, Sec. 10 (1932): TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 11007
(Williams, 1934): T-x. SlAT., PENAL CODE, art. 483 (Vernon, 1936).
E.g., Aix. Coi):, tt. 14, Sec. 161 (1940); N. D. Co.n,. Lws Secs. 9803a6, 98031)l
(Supp,. 1925).
"Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90 (Ky. 1822); Ky. CoNs-r. Art. X, Sec. 25 (1799):
"'I hat the rights of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state,
shall not be questioned."
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new constitution in 1850,- the General Assembly enacted a new law on the sub-
ject in 18538 and reenacted it in 1871. The present statute " is little changed
from that enacted m 1871. In 1946, the offense was changed from a misde-
meanor to a felony" The present statute says:
"(1) Any person, not expressly authorized by law, who
carries concealed a deadly weapon, other than an ordinary pocket
knife, on or about his person shall be confined in the peniten-
tiary for not less than two nor more than five years. (2) Sheriffs,
constables, marshals, policemen, and other numsterial officers, when
necessary for their protection im the discharge of their official duties;
United States mail carriers, when actually engaged in their duties;
and agents and messengers of express companies, when necessary for
their protection in the discharge of their official duties, may carry
concealed deadly weapons on or about their persons.-
12
The active militia, National Guard officers,' and conservation officers2 are
also exempt from the provisions of this statute.
The basic purpose of these statutes is to prevent the carrying of deadly
weapons 'without infringing upon the constitutional right to bear arms.' The
carrying of concealed weapons " is the causa causans of perhaps three-fourths
of the homicides which stain our jurisprudence. Could the legislatures and courts
discover some method by which this causeless evil practice can be reformed, the re-
sult would be a vast saving of valuable lives "v Since the carrying of deadly
weapons could not be completely prohibited, requiring the open carrying of
deadly weapons would at least warn " others who came in contact with
them that they were armed and dangerous persons, who were to be avoided
in consequence."" While it is true that the criminal who intends to commit a
greater crne would not be deterred by such a statute, it does greatly reduce the
danger that a deadly weapon will be used in a sudden quarrel or passion.
the offense is one which the courts use every legitimate effort to
suppress."" That the offense is still deemed a serious one is evidenced by the
changing of it, in 1946, from a misdemeanor to a felony, in Kentucky. Because
1 Ky. CONsT. Art. XIII, Sec. 25 (1850): "That the rights of the citizens to bear
arms in defense of themselves and the state, shall not be questioned; but the gen-
eral assembly ma pass laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons."
Ky. CoNs r. Sec. 1 (7): "The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the
State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons
from carrying concealed weapons."
1 Ky. Acts 1853, c. 1020, p. 186.
1 Ky. Acts 1871, c. 1888, p. 89.
"0 Ky. R. S. Sec. 435.280 (1948).
"I Ky. Acts 1946, c. 40, p. 105.
1"Ky. R. S. Sec. 435.230 (1948).
12 Ky. R. S. Sec. 37.250 (1948).
24 Ky. R. S. Sec. 38.420 (1948).
1 KY. R. S. Sec. 150.095 (1948).
"State v. Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259, 260 (1885).
1. Shorter v. State, 63 Ala. 129, 133 (1879).
"The purpose of such statutes is the prevention of crime. A large percentage
of the homicides in this country is due to the carrying of concealed weapons."
3 BURDICK, LAw OF CRiME isec. 742 n. 1 (1st ed. 1946).
11 Stripling v. State, 114 Ga. 538, 40 S.E. 733 (1902).
1" Ibid. °
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the courts recognize the gravity of the offense, they are generally inclined to
extend the interpretation of these statutes to their reasonable limits.
"To constitute the offense [under the Kentucky statute] it must be
established that the person was 'carrying the weapon; that it was concealed',
that it was 'deadly, that it was upon or about' his person." These, then, are
the four most important problems raised in interpreting the statute: what is
"carrying", what is "concealed", what constitutes a "deadly weapon", and when
is it "upon or about" the person.
The Kentucky court, in the early case of Commonwealth v. Walker,' said
that "carry" is a synonym of "bear" and locomotion is not essential.' In that
case, the defendant, standing in his shirt sleeves, asked for his pistol. His wife
brought him his coat, which lie put on. He then put his hand into lus coat
pocket and pulled out a pistol. The court held that this was "carrying" within
the meaning of the statute. It also appears from this decision that no certain
length of time is required, and a mere instant of time is sufficient.'
In Avery v. Coninmonwealth,"' the court, in definng "carry" said: "To carry
the weapon means that it must be on the person or so connected or annexed to
the person thpt the weapon is carried along as the person moves. If it is in the
pocket or in the clotlng of the person, or if it is in some receptacle attached to
or earned by the person as lie moves, he is carrying the weapon."''  In Common-
wealth v. Nunnelly," the court applied the definition of the court in the Avery
case to see if the weapon was "carried" when found under the front seat of the
automobile of the accused. Chief Justice Dietzman, writing for the court in the
Nannelly case, said:
"In the second place, it is highly doubtful whether the
accused was carrying the weapon. Whilst it is true that both
he and the weapon moved -along as the machine moved, yet appellant
could move and in fact at the time of his arrest had moved away from
the place of rest of the pistol without its moving and further, it was
not impossible for the machine to have moved off without control or
under someone else's control, taking the revolver with it and the
accused remaimng stationary by the roadside or moving in some
opposite direction."''
Almost tvo years later, the same justice Dietzman dissented in a case where
the court held a man guilty of the offense although the weapon was in an
automobile. "' In his opinion, he st ited that the court had ignored the definition
of "carry" given in the Avery case, and contended that "This definition does not
include the movement of a deadly weapon caused by a vehicle even though
such vehicle be controlled or operated by the person accused."'-
However, the Kentucky court has not accepted this view. It seems that
SAvery v. Commonwealth. 223 Kv. 248. 252, 3 S.V 2d 624, 626 (1928).
7 Ky. L. Rep. 218 (Super. Ct. 1885) (abstract).
"Ibid.
,lccord. Thompson v. City of Little Rock. 194 Ark. 78. 105 SA 2d 537 (1937).
223 Ky. 248, 3 SA 2d 624 (1928).
Id. at 252, 3 S.V. 2d at 626.
247 Kv. 109. 56 S.W 2d 689 (1933).
AId. at 111, 59 S.V 2d at 690.
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 626, 78 SA 2d 749 (1934).
Id. at 631, 78 S.W 2d at 751.
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a weapon in a vehicle can be "earned" within the definition in the Avery case.
While it is true that a person could move without the weapon, or the weapon
could be moved without the person, the same is true of a weapon in a receptacle
earned along by the person, which is an example given in the definition. Whether
or not the weapon was earned depends upon the factual situation as it actually is,
not as it might be. If a person is in an automobile with a weappn, then it
could be "earned along as the person moves." Regardless of that, however, the
definition given in the Avery case was dictum, and its application in the
Nunnelly case was unnecessary to the decision. If the word "carry" is interpreted
in its natural and popular meamng, it seems clear that a person may "carry' a
weapon in an automobile. As will be seen, this conclusion is borne out by a
number of cases wherein the court, without specifically adverting to the definition
of "carry", upheld convictions of persons whose violations were based on weapons
concealed in automobiles.
Most other states are in accord with Kentucky in their interpretation of the
word "carry" It is a synonym of "bear",3 and locomotion is not essential31 "It
is necessary only that the weapon be so connected with the person that the
locomotion of the body would carry with it, the weapon as concealed." Most
other courts, like Kentucky, have not restricted their definition so as to rule out
weapons earned in automobiles&' Such a restriction would seem to defeat the
purpose of the statute, since the danger is just as great if the weapon is concealed,
but readily accessible in an automobile as it would be if the same weapon were
concealed in the clothes of the person.
To conceal means to " hide, secrete, screen, cover."' "The offense de-
nounced and intended to be pumshed by the statute, manifestly is the practice
of carrying deadly weapons concealed from ordinary and common observation,
and not such open and visible arming of the person as would be readily seen and
understood. "" "To establish that it is concealed, it must be shown that any
one coming in contact with the person as is customary m the ordinary methods
of living in society would not observe the weapon. 'Concealed' does not mean
that it must be so hidden that it can only be discovered by a person making a
special investigation to ascertain whether the person has such a weapon. It is
sufficient if it is so concealed that it would not be observed by persons making
ordinary contact with him in associations such as are common in the everyday
walks of life."
If a weapon is carred in such a manner that it can be seen by a person
approaclung from -one direction, but cannot be seen by a person approaching
31 Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387 (1858); Smith v. State, 79 Ala. 257 (1885).
-1 Owen v. State, supra note 30; see State v. Nieto, 101 Ohio St. 409, 130 N.E. 663
(1920). Contra: Ex parte Bergen, 61 Cal. App. 226, 214 Pac. 521 (1923).
-Thomas v. State. 9 Ala. App. 67 - 64 So. 192, 193 (1913).
Clark v. City of Jackson, 155 Miss. 668, 124 So. 807 (1929); Hall v. State, 102
Tex. Cr. R. 329, 277 S.W. 129 (1925).
Williams v. Commonwealth, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 663, 664, 37 S.W 680, 681 (1896).
Daniel v. Commonwealth, 6 Ky. Op. 32, 33 (1872).
3, Avery v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 248, 252, 3 S.W. 2d 624, 626 (1928).
"The test is, Was it carried so as not to be discernible by ordinary observation?"
Mularkey v. State, 201 Wis. 429, -- 230 N.W 76, 77 (1930); accora, People '.
Euctice, 371 Ilk 159, 20 N.E. 2d 83, 85.
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from another direction, it is not concealedY Nor is a weapon concea.led if enough
of it can be seen to positively identify it.-"  But if the weapon is completely
covered by the person s clothes, even though its form can be seen well enough
to identify it, it is, nevertheless, concealed." Nor does the fact that all those
who are in a person's presence know that he is carrying a concealed weapon
excuse him."0
The interpretation of concealment by the Kentucky court, in theory and in
application, is in harmony with the interpretation of most American courts. It
has been held that if only part of the weapon is Visible, the weapon is concealed."
A few states, by statute, require the weapon to be fully exposed. ' - If the legisla-
ture desires that to be the law, it is better that it be included in the statute,
rather than supplied by the courts by extending "concealment" beyond its natural
meaning. The similarity between partial concealment and the situation where
the outline and identity of the weapon can be seen through a person s clothes
raises the question whether or not the latter situation should constitute conceal-
ment. However, it would be almost impossible to ascertain objectively when
the weapon is actually capable of positive identification and when there is only
a reasonably probable belief as to the identity of the weapon. In addition, while
the form may be visible as a certain moment, the weapon is probably being
carred with intent to conceal, and it is likely that there is effective concealment
much of the time. It is submitted that if the weapon is completely covered, or
if enough of it is not actually exposed to view as to enable it to be seen and
positively identified by a person making ordinary contacts, then the weapon
should be held to be concealed. But if it is entirely exposed to view, or if
enough of it is exposed to view so that it can be seen and positively identified,
the weapon should not be held to be concealed.
The statutes of several states forbid the carrying concealed of only stated
weapons," such as pistols, brass knuckles, dirks, swords in canes, spears, and
boNie knives. The majority of the statutes list certain weapons, with the added
provision that also included in the statute are any other deadly or dangerous
weapons." The Kentucky statute does not name any specific weapon.' The
Court of Appeals has defined a "deadly weapon" as intended by this statute to be:
1 any weapon which is or could be habitually so earned [concealed], and
with which personal injury could be inflicted it was not intended to restrict
1 Reid v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 800, 184 S.W. 2d 101 (1944); Williams v. Coin-
monwealth, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 663, 37 S.W 680 (1896); accord, Stripling v. State, 114 Ga.
538, 10 S.E. 733 (1902).
Daniel v. Commomealth, 6 Ky. Op. 32 (1872).
- Robinson v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 53, 268 S.W 840 (1925): see Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 304 Kv. -190, 192, 200 S.V 2d 913, 911 (1947). But see Cotton v.
State, 88 Ala. 168, 7 So. 148, 149 (1890).
',Hall v. Commo-wealth, 309 Ky. 74, 215 S.W 2d 840 (1948).
"State N. Bias. 37 La. Ann. 258 (1885); State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856).
E.g., Miss. Coot ANN. Sec. 2079 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. Sec. 11307
(1935).
11E.g., ARK. SrAr. AN. Sec. -1-450 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. Sec. 347 (Park, 1914):
N. J. REV. STAT. Sec. 2:176-41 (1937); R. 1. GEx. LAWS, c. 612, Sec. 31 (1938); TENN.
CODr ANN. Sec. 11007 (Williams, 1934).
"E.g.. ARIZ, Coin; ANN. Sec. 13-2205 (1939); CoNN. GEN. STAr. Sec. 6219 (1930);
FiAi. STAT. Sec. 790.01 1941): KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 21-2411 (1935); MicH. Com r,
LAwS, art. 16753 (1929): Miss. CODE ANN. Sec. 2079 (1942); Nim. REV. STAT. Sec.
28-1001 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 14-269 (1943).
,"Supra note 10.
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this list to suh weapons or instruments as are made and designated for offensive
or defensive purposes, or for the destruction of life ,,40
It is clear that a pistol is a deadly weapon. But if an essential part is
missing so that the pistol is incapable of being fired, it is not a deadly weapon
if that missing part is not on or about the person carrying the pistol.17 This seems
to be the prevailing view of the courts." There is dictum in the opimon of
Jarvis v. Commonwealth that if a pistol taken apart is capable of being put
together quickly, it would constitute a deadly weapon.'" A razor is also a deadly
weapon within the meamng of the statute.'
In interpreting the concealed weapon statute, the problem which has given
the courts the most difficulty is deciding what is meant by "on or about" the
person. If the weapon is "on the person, that is, concealed in his clothes, there
is no doubt that the statute applies. But what is meant by "about" the person?
The Louisiana court has stated that Kentucky holds that "on" and "about"
are synonymous." That court based its statement upon Commonwealth v. Stur-
geon. " In that case, the defendant was accused of carrying a pistol concealed
in a small satchel under the wagon seat upon which he was sitting. There were
two other people in the wagon, and the court reversed the defendant's conviction
on the grounds that there had been no evidence that the satchel belonged to
the defendant. The court expressly reserved the question whether it was carried
"about" his person. In the Avery case, it was said that the statement by the
Louisiana court was unjustified, but the court again expressly declined to give
any opimon as to whether a physical connection is necessary before a weapon is
"about" the person. = In Commonwealth v. Nunnelly,5' the accused was arrested
while outside of his car, and a pistol was found under the front seat of his car
by the arresting officers. The court said that in order to get the pistol, the
accused would have had to get out of the car and raise the seat, and thus, "it
was not in such close proximity to the person of the accused as that he could
have readily secured it and used it should occasion have arisen. The pistol
was not, therefore, in such close proximity to the person of the accused as that
it could be said to be on or about' his person; conceding arguendo that there
need not be some physical connection between the weapon and the person-just
such close proximity as that the weapon may be readily secured."' In this case,
as can be seen, the court did not fully adopt the view that there need be no
" Truax v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 299 (Super. Ct. 1892).
" Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 190, 206 S.W 2d 831 (1947). The writer
did not find any Kentucky case which discussed whether or not aii unloaded pistol
is a deadly weapon. In Cutsinger v. Commonwealth. 7 Bush 392 (Ky. 1870). it ap-
pears from the facts that the pistol may have been unloaded, and there was a con-
%iction. There is dictum in Ewing v. Commonwealth, 129 Kv. 237. 2-16. 111 S.V 352.
355 (1908), that an unloaded pistol is a deadly weapon within the meaning of a
statute prohibiting the pointing of a deadly weapon at another.
Evins v. State, 46 Ala. 88 (1871); Smith v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 606. 232 S.W
811 (1921).
":'Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 306 Kv. 190. 193, 206 SAV 2d 831. 833 (1917)- c,
Hutchinson v. State, 62 Ala. 3 (1878).
-4Williams v. Commonwealth, 301 Kv. 761. 202 S.W 2d -108 (1917): Common-
wealth v. Hart, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 862 (Super. Ct. 1893) (abstract): Truax v. Comnion-
wealth, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 299 (Super. Ct. 1892).
51 State v. Brunson. 162 La. 902, 111 So. 321, 323 '1927).
r 18 Ky. L. Rep. 613, 37 SA 680 (1896).
-3Avery v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 248, 3 S.W. 2d 62- (1928).
217 Kv. 109. 56 S.W 2d 689 (1933).
=Id. at 111, 56 S.V 2d at 690.
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physical connection, but rather said that even if it did accept such a view, the
weapon would, nevertheless, not be "about" his person on the basis of the par-
ticular facts. The Kentucky court did definitely adopt such a view, however, in
Hampton v. Commonwealth.' A black-lack, a pistol, and a rifle were concealed
under some clothes on the shelf immediately behind the defendant driver in a
coupe type automobile. The court felt that " the weapon in question
was in such close proximity to him that he could reach it more easily and could
use it more promptly than if it had been concealed on his person."" The court
defined "about his person" as "convement of access and within immediate physical
reach."' The only subsequent case in which the court has been called upon to
apply this holding was Turley v. Commonwealth.' In that case, it was claimed
by the defendant that his pistol was locked in the glove compartment of his
automobile and that the key to the compartment was in the ignition switch. The
court considered the ease with which the weapon could be reached and the
promptness with which it could be used and decided that if the facts were as
defendant claimed, then the pistol was not "about" his person. This test used
by the court might be called the accessibility and convemence of use test.
The Kentucky view is in accord with that taken by a majority of the courts.
Weapons concealed in a-basket' or suitcase'u carried by the person, underneath
a buggy seat,' on the floor of an automobile,' in the door pocket of an automo-
bile " and even in a satchel on the runmng board,' have been held to be "about"
the person. To hold that "on" and "about" are synonymous would defeat the
basic purpose of the statute. While it is apparently legal to carry a weapon in
an automobile, if it is uncovered and capable of being seen by a person casually
looking into the automobile,' it is illegal to conceal the weapon in an automobile
unless it is put where it cannot be easily reached and used. The difficulty now
facing the courts in automobile cases is where to draw the line. There is a wide
area between a shelf back of the driver s seat and a locked glove compartment
with the keys in the ignition which is still open to question. Just when a weapon
reaches the point that it becomes so accessible and convement to use as to be
"about" the person is far from certain. The length of time before the weapon
can be used seems to be an important factor if not the controlling factor. It
would seem from the decisions that the weapon must be capable of being used
257 Ky. 626, 78 S.V. 2d 748 (1934).
Id. at 630, 78 S.W 2d at 750.
Id. at 628, 78 S.W 2d at 750.
"307 Ky. 89, 209 S.W 2d 843 (1948).
"' Boles %,. State, 86 Ga. 255, 12 S.E. 361 (1890); State v. Jones, 168 La. 55, 121 So.
300 (1929) (knapsack); State v. McManus, 89 N. C. 559 (1893).
61 Warren v. State, 94 Ala. 79, 10 So. 838 (1892); Willis v. State, 105 Ga. 633,
32 S.E. 155 (1898) (on seat beside him on railroad car): Livesay v. Helbig, 87 N. J.
Law 303, 94 At. 47 (1915). Contra: Cunningham v. State, 76 Ala. 88 (1884) (saddle-
bag); State v. Watson, 108 S. C. 383, 94 S.E. 871 (1918).
1- Emerson v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 354, 190 S.W. 485 (1916). Contra: Ladd v.
State, 92 Ala. 58, 9 So. 401 (1891); Hayes v. State, 28 Ga. App. 67, 110 S.E. 320 (1922).
'4 Brown v. United States, 30 F. 2d 474 (App. D. C. 1929); Clark v. City of Jack
son, 155 Miss. 668, 124 So. 807 (1929); State v. Renaid, 273 S.W 1058 (Mo. 1925).
e' Porello v. State, 121 Ohio St. 280, 168 N.E. 135 (1929) (left door); Schraeder v.
State, 28 Ohio App. 248, 162 N.E. 647 (1928) (left door): Spears v. State, 112 Tex.
Cr. R. 506, 17 S.W 2d 809 (1929) (right door). Contra: State v. Brunson, 162 La.
!;02, 111 So. 321 (1927) (left door).
ZArnistiong v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 335, 265 S.W 701 (1924).
" Hampton v. ComMoxwealth, 257 Ky. 626, 632, 78 S.V 2d 748, 751 (1934) (dis-
senting opinion).
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almost immediately. Despite its uncertainty, the accessibility and convenience of
use test seems to be the most desirable solution to the problem.
A few states, in their statutes,'7 require a criminal intent before there can
be a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. There is no such requirement
in the Kentucky statute, and the Kentucky court has held that the intent with
which the weapon is earned is immaterial.' It is the carrying itself and not the
intent with which it is earned that constitutes the offense. Even if it is clear
that the weapon is earned for a harmless purpose, such as carrying it to someone
else after buying it for him, the statute is Violated.' In Swincher v. Common-
wealth,-" the defendant had earned a concealed weapon while working as a special
policeman. The statute creating this special police force was held unconstitu-
tional, and as a result, defendant's conviction was affirmed, the court saying that
his intent was immaterial except to mitigate the punishment.-'
The courts in junsdictions whose statutes do not specifically require intent
are divided on whether or not intent is material.' In almost all those states
where the statutes expressly require intent, and in those states that have inter-
preted their statutes to require intent, the carrying of a deadly weapon concealed
raises a presumption or inference of unlawful intent which the defendant may
rebut. This interpretation of the statutes seems to be the better one. There
would not be the great difficulty of affirmatively proving the intent, since intent
would be presumed unless the defendant proved otherwise.
Several states, in their statutes, exempt people on their own premises." There
is no such exemption in Kentucky's statute, and the court holds that the statute
applies to a person while on his own premises.7' This is in accord with the
prevailing view.
As has been seen, a rather complete interpretation of the various elements in
the Kentucky statute had been built up by the Court of Appeals prior to 1946,
when the General Assembly increased the punishment for its violation. If the
General Assembly had felt that the court's interpretations were incorrect or
undesirable, it would, presumably, have made such changes as it desired in the
statute at the same time. Since the statute remains, in substance, as it was before,
one is entitled to assume that the decisions of the court under the earlier statute
are still applicable under the present statute. J.isEs C. BLAIR
17 E.g., LA. CODE OF CRim. LAw, art. 740-95 (Dart, 1943): N. D. CoNi. LAwS Sec.
9803bl (Supp. 1925); PA. STAT., tit. 18, Sec. 401 (Purdon, 1936); TI NN. CODE ANN.
Sec. 11007 (Williams, 1934); VT. PuB .LAwS Sec. 8409 (1933).
Swincher v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1897, 72 S.W 306 (1903): Truax
v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 299 (Super. Ct. 1892): Cutsinger v. Commonwealth,
7 Bush 392 (Ky. 1870).
Cutsinger v. Commonwealth, supra note 68.
'24 Ky. L. Rep. 1897, 72 S.W 306 (1903).
7iId. at 1898, 72 S.W at 306.
2That it is: State v. Lanucci, 4 Penn. 193, 55 AtI. 336 (Del. 1903); State v.
Roberts, 39 Mo. App. 47 (1890): State v. Gilbert, 87 N.C. 527 (1882); Page v. State,
50 Tenn. 198 (1871); see State v. Williams, 70 Iowa 52, 29 N.W 801 (1886). That
it is not: Goldsmith v. State, 99 Ga. 253, 25 S.E. 624 (1896); Redinour v. State, 65 Ind.
41 (1879): People v. Williamson, 200 Mich. 342, 166 N.W 917 (1918); Strahan v.
State, 68 Miss. 347, 6 So. 844 (1891).
7AE.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 14, Sec. 161 (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN Sec. 1-450 (1947):
IOWA CODE Sec. 695.2 (1946); MICH. CoMei. LAWS, art. 16753 (1929); N. M. STAr. ANN.
See. 41-1701 (1941): N. J. REV. STAT. Sec. 2:176-41 (1937); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. Scc.
14269 (1943); W. VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 6043 (1943).
'4 Commonwealth v. Puckett, 277 Ky.'131, 125 S.W 2d 1011 (1939); Common-
wealth v, Walker, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 218 (Super. Ct, 1885) (abstract).
